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The persistence of corruption in Russia is seen in path-dependent political structures on the 
one hand, while, on the other hand, concrete corruption-promoting mechanisms can be theo-
retically described at the level of the actor. The former approach lacks a general explanation 
of corruption, while the latter lacks the immanent possibility of embedding corrupt practices 
in specific cultural patterns. Recent approaches in organizational research promise a fruitful 
connection of both via the idea of organizational corruption, which explains corruption as a 
normalization process in an organizational context. The present article aims at extending this 
approach by an analytical model of decision-making in organizations based on a neo-institu-
tional framework. Decision-making situations will be constructed in the activity structure of 
organizations as the tension between formal-legal requirements and the legitimate goals of the 
organization as set out in the formal structure. Depending on whether decisions are oriented 
in accordance or or against legal requirements and the legitimate goals of the organization, a 
compliant decision, individual corruption, organizational corruption or whistle blowing be-
comes more likely. Thus, the link between different cultural concepts in Russia and corruption 
are systematically highlighted and integrated into the present model. It is shown that cultural-
historical patterns cannot be generalized to Russia, but often only promote corruption when 
specifically embedded in organizations.
Keywords: organizational corruption, neo-institutional approach, analytical framework, cor-
rupt decisions, cultural patterns.
Introduction
There is a broad scientific consensus on the negative social effects caused by corrupt 
practices in politics and business. The consequences include worldwide financial damage 
amounting to trillions of dollars [1; 2], loss of confidence in political actors and institu-
tions [3], undermining of health care systems [4; 5] and massive environmental damage 
[6]. Russia appears to be a prime example of the persistence of corrupt practices and, de-
spite all efforts to combat corruption [7; 8], has occupied a low position in the Corruption-
Perception-Index for decades [9].
Beside the causes of corrupt decisions by actors at the micro level, which have been 
well studied, especially in international, economic experimental research [10], the ethno-
graphic research literature describes historical path-dependent structures in Russia that 
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perpetuate corruption [11]. The former approach has problems with embedding cultural 
patterns in its rational-choice theoretical orientation [12] and thus incorporate specific 
Russian characteristics into the explanatory model. The latter lacks an analytical focus on 
explaining concrete decision-making processes that lead to corruption. At the heart of 
both approaches is the idea that corruption arises when individual actors seek personal 
enrichment  — be it for monetary gain or the concentration of political power. Subse-
quently, the question arises as to how both explanatory directions can be brought together 
without losing the claim to explain corruption in general or having to theoretically fade 
out path-dependent cultural specifics? 
Building on an organizational-sociological perspective on corrupt practices, the ar-
ticle describes a connection between decision-making at the micro level and the cultural 
imprint of decision-making processes at the macro level. This is because a large number 
of corrupt decisions emerge and establish themselves only in the context of organizations 
or are aligned with organizational criteria and do not necessarily aim at personal profit 
prospects [13–15]. The conceptual embedding of corrupt practices in an organizational 
context then allows a systematic perspective on the linkage of both levels of analysis to 
uncover mutual factors influencing the emergence of corrupt decisions.
To do so, the aim of this article is to develop an analytical framework that can claim 
generality of corrupt practices and also enable the systematic integration of case-specific 
explanatory factors. First, the current theoretical concepts for explaining corruption at the 
micro-, meso- and macro-levels will be summarized. Secondly, the theoretical connection 
of the levels in an neo-institutional theoretical concept is presented, from which the ana-
lytical framework of decision-making situations in the activity structure of organizations 
is derived. Third, the cultural context of corrupt practices in Russia will be spelled out and 
differentiated on the dimensions of the analytical concept. The article ends with a short 
conclusion and discussion of the theoretical conception.
The state of the art
Multidisciplinary corruption research is conducted in criminology, economics, po-
litical science, sociology and other fields. Beside differentiations into types of corruption, 
such as enrichment in office vs. bribery, legislative vs. executive corruption, nepotism and 
patronage, etc. [16; 17], we distinguish three main focuses in the theoretical literature on 
corruption: Firstly, actor-centred approaches focus on the modelling of alternative courses 
of action in which corrupt decisions are made on the basis of either rational calculations 
or the normative orientations of actors. Secondly, the affinity for corruption in a country 
or society is understood as a path-dependent, cultural pattern. Thirdly, explanations that 
refer to the procedural implementation of corrupt practices in organizational structures.
Actor-centred theories referring to rational choice theoretical assumptions construct 
decisions of actors along the possible realisation of their own preferences in consideration 
of the personal benefits and costs involved. A decision for an action is made if the per-
sonal (expected) benefit of the action is higher than the (expected) costs of the option and 
if the (expected) overall benefit of the action is greater than that of all other alternatives 
[18]. Rational-choice theories of crime suggest that corruption occurs when the personal 
(monetary) benefit is estimated to be greater than the resulting penalties and their antici-
pated probability of detection [19].
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In contrast to the assumptions of a rational cost-benefit analysis, approaches of 
norm-oriented actions focus on the reduction of complexity for decisions of actors by 
established or missing norms and values. Accordingly, options for goals and actions are 
over-complex and are limited and therefore manageable by internalized norms and values. 
While the establishment of different norms and values is theoretically regarded as being 
anchored in social structures, they only develop their function as a guideline for decisions 
for a particular actor [20; 21]. Sub-cultural theories then describe the distinction between 
specific group norms and dominant social norms, which can sometimes conflict. If social-
ly accepted goals are difficult to achieve by parts of the population, action-oriented norms 
can establish themselves in subcultures that also legitimize illegal means. Corruption oc-
curs when it is normatively accepted within the group or sub-culture [22].
Anomy theoretical approaches develop the assumption that the introduction of eco-
nomic requirements into other spheres of life devalues their original functions. Economic 
rationalities come to the fore, while other social norms of action control become less im-
portant. As a result of a rational calculation for one’s own enrichment and a simultaneous 
subjective loss of significance of the resulting damage for third parties, corrupt actions 
then arise [23–25]. 
The voluntarist theory of crime refers to developed values that differentiate the goals 
of actors and thus select alternatives for actions in a complex environment. Accordingly, 
the moral development of the subject affects the acceptance of (legal) norms and the le-
gitimacy of certain goals. Traditional value orientations then lead to greater norm accep- 
tance, while materialistic value orientations tend to favour norm deviations and lead to 
delinquency [26]. 
In contrast to actor-centred theories, path-dependent culture-theoretical approaches 
understand corruption as a historically established process at the macro level, which then 
diffuses into individual areas of social life and ensures a higher affinity for corruption. Thus, 
Levin and Satarov (2000) [27] concretize path dependencies from the transition period of 
the Soviet Union to post-Soviet Russia for the persistence of social norms, which lead to “[a]
dministrative bodies in Russia, especially at the regional level, continued to play on the eco-
nomic field according to rules that they established for themselves” [27, p. 117]. 
While Avtonomov (2006) [28] more generally describes the historical connection be-
tween state, society and economy in Russia as conducive to corruption [28], Cheloukhine 
and King (2007) [29] specify the causes of the high degree of diffusion of corruption in 
a steady system of social relations between organized crime, law enforcement and civil 
service [29].
Ledeneva (2013) [30] points to the problem of virulent corruption and Russia’s au-
thoritarian political system with a dilemma situation according to which authoritarian 
political control limits the differentiation of institutional control mechanisms and the lack 
of control mechanisms in turn makes authoritarian control necessary to keep the state 
capable of action. This sistema then leads to “that currently Russia cannot rely on the insti-
tutions of civil society or any institutionalized system of checks and balances” [30, p. 1138] 
and is stabilized by network structures between an Inner Circle of the political party, Core 
Contacts in the national ministries, Mediated Contacts in the regional administrations 
and Useful Friends in the economic sphere [30]. 
While the aforementioned approaches on the actor level lacks the concrete selection 
of established values and norms to the respective decisions on action, path-dependent 
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attempts cover only a specific spectrum of the origins of corrupt practices and missing out 
a generally valid explanation for their emergence.
Between actor-centred theories and path-dependent explanations there are organiza-
tional sociological approaches. These construct corrupt decisions in organizational situa-
tions, in which the choice of corruption depends not only on structural conditions but also 
on the normative and organizational-cultural characteristics of the organization. Thus, 
Anand, Ashforth and Mahendra (2004) [31] describe the persistence of corrupt practices 
in organizations as a mutually reinforcing process of rationalization strategies of existing 
corruption and the selection of these strategies via the socialization of new employees in 
the respective company. Corrupt practices consequently diffuse into the normative order 
of the organization as business as usual and are continued without question [31; 32]. 
Aguilera and Vadera (2008) [33] specify the interplay between the basis of authority, 
the underlying motives and the evaluation strategies of the decisions made by actors at 
the top of the company hierarchy as an explanatory mechanism for the establishment of 
organizational forms of corruption. Corruption thus does not simply remain rooted at 
the individual level of actor decisions, but can only be adequately described in various 
forms through organizational-cultural factors such as the attribution of authority and the 
available evaluation strategies [33]. 
Campbell and Göritz (2014) [34] complement an organizational culture perspective 
and distinguish between corrupt and non-corrupt organizations, each of which is sup-
ported by independent norms and values at the managerial and employee level [34].
What remains inadequately explained, however, is how the relationships between the 
cultural embedding of corruption, its organizational embedding and the decisions of ac-
tors coincide [35; 36]. Pohlmann, Höly and Klinkhammer (2016) [15] make a central 
contribution, in which they describe corruption in the context of organizations on the 
basis of an institutional theory approach [15; 37]. Conceptually, they distinguish between 
individual corruption, which is primarily located on the recipient side for personal profit 
prospects, and organizational corruption, which is oriented towards organizational and 
institutional criteria [15; 38; 39]. The chance of organizational corruption becoming es-
tablished is therefore based firstly on its usefulness for the organizational goal, secondly 
on its legitimacy through unwritten rules in the organization and the organizational field, 
thirdly on the integration of organizational deviance into the organization-specific reward 
system and fourthly on the hierarchical level of deviant personnel [15]. In the context of 
an empirical study of organizational deviance in the form of manipulation in transplanta-
tion centres in Germany, Pohlmann and Höly (2017) [40] reconstruct the above criteria 
using general mechanisms of competitive pressure, hierarchical pressure, rationalization 
and legitimization and socialization [40]. While the separation of individual and organi-
zational corruption as distinct phenomena explained by different theoretical approaches 
seems problematic, their approach includes institutional criteria in the organizational en-
vironment, as well as organizational structural and cultural factors.
The analytical framework of corrupt decisions in organizations
Based on the neo-institutional theory, the explanatory approach of corrupt practices 
in the organizational context by Pohlmann, Höly and Klinkhammer (2016) [15] will be 
expanded with a narrower analytical concept of decision-making situations in organiza-
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tions. This concept should firstly retain the theoretical scope of the explanation of corrupt 
practices, secondly re-arrange the theoretical preconditions on concrete levels of analysis, 
and thirdly integrate into a model not only organizational corruption but also corruption 
based on personal profit prospects.
As objectifications of reality, institutions are concretized in a mutual legitimation pro-
cess between actors and their environment. They structure the scope of action through more 
or less shared understandings of the reality [41]. For their decisions, actors then experience 
validity through institutions as “a compelling massivity for the objective reality to be inter-
nalized” [41, p. 184; 42; 43]. Institutions are the central explanatory factor for the spread 
of organizational structures and constitute the environment on which organizations orient 
themselves [42; 44]. If organizations can plausibly demonstrate that they adapt legitimate 
expectations, they are more likely to acquire resources from this environment [42; 45].
From a theoretical perspective the organizational environment can be divided into an 
organizational and an institutional field. As an organizational field, DiMaggio and Powell 
address “these organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institu-
tional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other 
organizations that produce similar services or products” [44, p. 148; 46]. The institutional 
field in which the organization is embedded is constructed as an emergent set of binding 
laws, normative expectations of best practice in organizational design and unquestioned 
expectations of organizational structures. Regulatory institutions are laws, contracts and the 
like which exert a pressure to act by threatening to impose sanctions. Normative institutions 
restrict actions via the moral pressure of internalized values and the pressure of expectations 
of generalized norms in the environment. As soon as views on reality come into play without 
being questioned, they are typified as cognitive institutions [47]. What appears to be rational 
and legitimate in the institutional field binds organizations to the extent that “organizations 
are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined by prevailing rationalized 
concepts of organizational work and institutionalized in society” [42, p. 340].
Regulatory institutions in the form of laws are used as an analytical reference point for 
the present concept of corruption. They serve as a basis for assessing whether a disposition 
to act can be described as corrupt or not. In the demarcation to regulative institutions, the 
structure of cognitive and normative institutions is hereinafter summarized as the cultural 
environment. Legitimate goals of the organization are directed at this cultural environment. 
If cultural and legal institutions conflicts with each other, this may lead to a decoupling 
between the formal façade of the organization and the actual activity structure within the 
organization [42]. Thus, on the one hand the formal structure serve as a façade to remain 
connecTable  in the organizational environment and on the other hand in the “inner-life” 
of the organization unclear decision-making situations for the staff arise. Decision-making 
situations in organizations are therefore (possible) tension ratios between the alignment 
with the legitimate goals of the organization and the orientation towards regulatory institu-
tions in the organizational environment. So they can be in the sense of the legitimate goals 
and/or the regulative guidelines or contradict these (Table 1).
If a decision is aligned with both legal rules on corruption and the legitimate objec-
tives of an organization, the decision is called compliant1. Decisions that are made against 
1 The distinction between the basis of the decision and the factual action remains central. The latter 
can be regarded as corrupt in the form of unintended consequences or in the assessment by third parties. 
However, this assessment remains outside the present analytical concept.
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the legitimate goals of an organization, but are aligned with the regulatory environment 
of the organization are denominated here as whistle blowing. In contrast to a conceptual 
narrowing of whistle blowing, it is pointed out that in the organizational decision-making 
process it is more likely to accept damage to one’s own organization than to make illegal 
decisions. Consequently, the probability of disclosing insider information in favour of le-
gal compliance increases. When decisions are directed against regulatory institutions, we 
speak of corruption. If the decisions are in line with organizational goals, organizational 
corruption is more likely. In cases of personal enrichment and in contradiction to organi-
zational goals, the probability of individual corruption increases.
Table  1. Decision types of the staff depending on the alignment with legitimate objectives 
of the organization and the regulatory organizational environment
Orientation of the decision Along the legitimate goals of the organization
Contrary to the legitimate goals 
of the organization
Along the regulatory organiza-
tional environment Compliant Decision (C) Whistle Blowing (WB)
Contrary to the regulatory orga-
nizational environment Organizational Corruption (OC) Individual Corruption (IC)
S o u r c e: Own representation.
In everyday decision-making situations organizational-cultural rules intervene, 
which help to structure the decisions of the staff [15; 31; 34]. For if all possible decision-
making options had to be formally determined and thought through, the functionality of 
an organization would fail due to the over-complexity of its own rule-making [13]. Actors 
are socialized in a cultural framework and, through their work as personnel, they bring 
culturally learned rules into the organization, which — embedded in the organizational 
culture — can develop validity there for concrete dispositions to act. Culturally socialized 
knowledge increases the chance that personnel will orient themselves to it in decision-
making situations. For the integration of institutional expectations in an organizational 
context makes their transfer, maintenance and persistence more likely [48]. Therefore, if 
actors are socialized in an environment in which deviations from formal rules are norma-
tively more accepted the chance of deviating from regulatory institutions increases inside 
the organization. The individual actor is then confronted not only with the formal require-
ments of the organization (cultural institutions), the legal regulations (regulative institu-
tions), but also the shared, informal expectations within the organization (organizational 
culture) and his or her own socialization (cultural setting).
Cultural concepts of corruption in Russia
As a general model for describing corrupt practices, the analytical framework re-
lies on further short-range models from which hypotheses for specific factors influencing 
the decision-making process can be derived. In order to develop corruption research in 
Russia in a fruitful way, it is necessary to examine the cultural preconditions, which find 
their way into the formal structures of organizations as institutionalized expectations and 
can be taken into account in corrupt decision-making [49]. They will be differentiated 
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between wider institutionalized expectations on legal behavior and institutions related 
more specifically to organizational work2.
Suhara (2004) [50] refers to the scepticism about the prevailing legal system that is 
anchored in the Russian culture. With the term Legal Nihilism, he describes a general 
mistrust of the law in general, the law enforcement authorities and a lack of mental in-
ternalization of the law in the population. He contrasts Russian Legal Nihilism with the 
culture of the rule of law anchored in Western Europe and attributes the difference to a 
path-dependent development since tsarist Russia. The starting points for this develop-
ment are identified as the low degree of formal codification of the law of the time and the 
arbitrary interpretation within the former judicial system, which continue to have an ef-
fect throughout the Soviet era and into the present day. Parallel to a lower level of cultural 
anchoring of the formalized legal system, he points to the historical co-development of 
an Ethical Dualism. This describes the peculiar mentality according to which moral over 
legal premises are set in everyday decisions [50]. Using the description of the term Potem-
kin Villages Ledeneva (2013) [30] explains the phenomenon of the separation of legality 
(zakonnost) and justice (spravedlivost) in Russia: “The duality of norms, the gap between 
the formal and informal, and the arbitrary nature of their application make the practical 
norms indispensable know-how” [30, p. 1143]. The term Potemkin Villages comes from 
stories of a fake porTable village built solely to impress Empress Catherine II by Grigory 
Potemkin and stands for the distinction between a façade and the reality behind. Together, 
the historical developments in Russia point to a loss of importance of regulatory institu-
tions in the form of laws and thus, according to the present model, increase the chances 
for both individual and organizational corrupt decisions.
Next to the cultural relationship to regulatory institutions, other concepts emerged 
in Russia that have been consolidated as normative institutions and can be related to cor-
rupt decisions. Feeding (kormlenie) is described as “a system in which the people of each 
district ‘fed’ the ruler’s representatives on food and other material supplies, namely korm 
(stipend in kind)” [50, p. 389]. Originally established in the late Medieval Times, it was 
regarded on the one hand as a temporary reward for civil servants who could thus fill their 
own pockets and on the other hand as an incentive to fulfil various regulatory functions 
in the constituencies despite the low level of central control. Feeding developed after its 
official prohibition in 1555 into an informal norm of abuse of office up to a “personali- 
zed system of allocation, the culture of privileges, and the redistribution principles have 
promulgated free-riding, which became most pronounced in Putin’s Russia in the form of 
kickbacks” [30, p. 1141]. As an informal form of exchange, Feeding is both deviant from 
the law per se and indifferent to the legitimate goals of an organization. In principle, it 
aims at personal profit prospects and seems to increase the chance for decisions in favour 
of individual corruption along the aforementioned type formation.
The Blat phenomenon, which originates from the times of the Soviet Union, stands 
for the informal exchange of favours in personal networks under restrictive access to 
goods and services. In contrast to Kormlenie, Blat is not necessarily an abuse of authority 
and, as opposed to bribery, it rules out direct barter transactions [51; 52]. Blat, as a cultu- 
rally rooted social practice, establishes itself as a network of personal favours in opposi-
2 Conceptually, specific explanatory factors are not evaluated deterministically. They express the 
chances of realizing individual types of decisions within an organization. In this form, they serve to form 
hypotheses, whose expression in probabilities remains an empirical question.
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tion to regulatory institutions and the legitimate aims of organizations for the benefit of 
personal advantages3. As a socialized, normative institution, it seems to favour individual 
corruption over the other three types of decisions.
Another established normative rule is found in the term krugovaya poruka, originally 
a kind of joint responsibility for the members of a village community. Used as a traditional 
means of government, the entire community was held responsible if a governmental re-
quirement (e. g. taxes or other levies) was not met. As a result, communities responded 
with a closed system of informal checks and balances among themselves with consequent 
restrictions on individual rights for the benefit of the collective [30]. Krugovaya poruka 
changed after its formal abolition into a form of internal group cover-up of crimes against 
outsiders. It protects group interests through norms of mutual control against both the 
external regulatory environment and whistleblower from within the group. This leads to 
the expectation that the probability for whistle blowing will be reduced as a decision type 
in favour of organizational corruption.
Concepts in Russia which may influence decision-making opportunities of actors via 
the mechanism of socialization as normative institutions are supplemented by specific 
deviant practices of organizations. Thus, especially in companies, these seem to have es-
tablished themselves as a legitimate response to longer-term allocation problems inherent 
in the Soviet system, path-dependent in the formal structures of organizations [53]. One 
form of deviant practices widespread in Russian companies was the recruitment of mid-
dlemen, also known as Tolkachi. These were paid to acquire non-legally available resour- 
ces to achieve the companies’ planning goals. Tolkachi made use of personal relationships 
with other companies and authorities [52; 54; 55]. In contrast to production networks, 
in which resources were mutually exchanged as required, Tolkachi were mainly paid in 
roubles or hard currency [56]. Ledeneva (2001) [52] refers to a historical development 
of the Tolkachi, whose current function is still the circumvention of existing rules for the 
benefit of the organization, but this function is fulfilled either by their own departments 
or private security services (Krysha) [52]. This integration of normative practices into the 
formal structure of enterprises indicates an orientation towards the legitimate goals of the 
organization contrary to the regulatory institutions in its environment. Therefore it can 
be assumed that there is an increased chance for organizational corruption in decision-
making situations.
Otkat refers to the informal practice widespread in Russia, which, unlike the use of 
Tolkachi, takes the form of kickback payments or commissions from companies to state 
officials or other companies in order to secure advantages for one’s own company [57]. Ac-
cording to Avtonomov (2006) [28], Otkat is closely linked to the transition from a planned 
to a market economy and the associated dynamization of state influence on the economy. 
Compared with the previously centrally determined distribution of resources, access to 
these resources has become increasingly decentralized and regulated via partially priva- 
tized companies [28]. With dwindling control possibilities, this paved the way for the dis-
tributing agents to introduce kickback payments informally, so that Otkat “have become 
the core modus operandi of the informal exchange of favours” [57, p. 278]. While this 
informal norm argues for a dilution of the impact of regulatory institutions, a distinction 
3 If, on the other hand, the network as a social form is placed in the focus of the analysis, Blat would 
conform to the goals of the overall network and would have to be reinterpreted analytically along the 
network criteria as a special form of organizational deviation.
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must be made between the donor and the recipient side in the alignment with the legiti-
mate goals of the organisation. While the paying side is oriented towards the legitimate 
objectives of the company, an environment shaped by Otkat promotes organizational cor-
ruption. In the kickback recipient’s perspective however, personal gains are at odds with 
legitimate organizational goals and individual corruption becomes more likely.
From earlier, structural factors various concepts promoting deviation developed in 
Russia, which established themselves as normative and cognitive institutions [58]. These 
may find their way into daily decision-making situations in different ways: “Reliance on 
unwritten rules is an outcome of the inefficiency of formal rules and the mechanisms for 
enforcing them, on one hand; and people’s lack of respect for formal rules and their ex-
plosive attitude towards formal institutions on the other” [52, p. 13]. In summary, for indi-
vidual culturally established concepts it is possible to find links to the preceding analytical 
model of organizational decision-making situations and to derive expected opportunities 
to influence these decisions (Table 2):
Table 2. Cultural concepts in Russia and their expected influence on decision-making situations
Cultural concept Integration in the analytical concept of decision situations
Expected influence on 
decision-making 
situations
Legal Nihilism Cultural loss of importance of regulatory insti-tutions OC (↑), IC (↑)
Ethic Dualism/ Potemkin 
Villages
Cultural loss of importance of regulatory insti-
tutions OC (↑), IC (↑)
Feeding (Kormlenie)
Adaptation of the normative institution via the 




Adaptation of the normative institution via the 





Adaptation of the normative institution via the 
staff in the activity structure/ organizational 
culture
OC (↑), WB (↓)
Tolkachi Adaptation of the normative institution in the formal structure OC (↑)
Otkat Adaptation of the normative institution in the formal structure
Briber: OC (↑);
Bribee: IC (↑)
Note: OC  — Organizational Corruption, IC  — Individual Corruption, WB  — Whistle Blowing, 
↑ — supporting mechanism, ↓ — inhibiting mechanism.
S o u r c e: Own representation
The integration of the presented Russian cultural concepts into the present analyti-
cal framework takes place on three levels. First, at the level of regulatory institutions, 
whose general loss of legitimacy in Russia seems to be deeply rooted in Russian society 
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and thus influences decision-making situations in organizations. Secondly, through 
socialized normative institutions, which enter the activity structure of organizations 
through their staff and thus influence decision-making processes. Thirdly, through 
normative institutions, which are integrated into the formal structure of organizations 
through their legitimate recognition in an isomorphic process. The chance of making 
corrupt decisions cannot therefore be generalized to Russia at all, but depends on the 
pervasion of the concepts in the organizational context. Depending on the degree of 
diffusion of the cultural concepts, there are tendencies for decision-making processes in 
organizations in Russia, which increase the chances for the organizational and/or indi-
vidual corrupt type of decision and, in the case of krugovaya poruka, additionally reduce 
the chance of whistle blowing. 
Conclusions and discussion
A major part of previous research on corrupt practices focuses their description and 
explanation on specific levels of analysis. These approaches produce helpful insights into 
concrete mechanisms that promote and/or inhibit corruption, but the degree of speciali-
zation obstructing the view on interactions between the micro-, meso- and macro-level. 
Based on the explanation of organizational corruption by Pohlmann, Höly, Klinkhammer 
(2016) [15], this article develops an analytical concept to link legal, cultural and organi-
zational-cultural mechanisms. Corrupt practices can thus be systematically investigated 
as decision-making processes in organizations and brought together into a holistic pic-
ture of the description of corruption. The model expands the generality of the explana-
tion to include organizational and individual corruption, compliant decisions and whistle 
blowing. It allows for the integration and development of concrete hypotheses at different 
levels of analysis, also. The construction of corruption as a decision-making process in 
organizational situations remains open to the findings of research on micro-connections, 
organizational factors of influence at the meso-level, as well as the results of ethnographic, 
path-dependent mechanisms at the macro level.
This was examined using culturally established concepts in Russia in order to advance 
the basis of hypothesis for the empirical proof of the variance of corruption in Russian 
organizations. The cultural paths are directed at different perspectives in the analytical 
model of corrupt decision making. In addition to general tendencies of a loss of signifi-
cance of regulatory institutions, specific concepts only unfolds their influence on corrupt 
types of decisions when embedded in concrete organizations.
A strength of neo-institutional approaches is the comprehensive consideration of the 
organizational embedding of social contexts and the ability to describe them in terms 
of general theory. This level of abstraction limits the general validity of empirical results 
because of the implicit assumption of emergence and theory-immanent interactions be-
tween all possible variables. Therefore, the modeling of the activity structure as a deci-
sion-making situation can serve as an analytical bridge to empirically tesTable hypotheses 
without having to throw the conceptual strengths of the theory overboard. Despite the 
aforementioned cultural mechanisms are anchored in Russian history, their degree of in-
stitutionalization and persistence remains empirically open. The concrete influence on 
the decision-making process in organisations thus always depends on the concrete insti-
tutional and organisational field.
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For further research, the presented model offers several possibilities for empirically 
testing theory-immanent relationships: Firstly, concrete institutional influences on in-
ternal organizational decisions can be tested using the aforementioned decision types; 
secondly, conflicts of institutional expectations and the resulting effects can be mapped; 
thirdly, the analytical approach allows comparisons within and between organizations, 
types of organizations, organizational and institutional fields at different levels of abstrac-
tion; fourthly, existing findings can be integrated into one model. In particular, the model 
provides a simple blueprint for empirical access to various forms of deviations in an or-
ganizational framework, which goes beyond the confinement of other theoretical models.
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Несмотря на формальные усилия по борьбе с коррупцией, в России она представля-
ется постоянной, стойкой проблемой с многочисленными социальными последстви-
ями. Причины устойчивости коррупции могут быть рассмотрены как с точки зрения 
инертных политическими структур, так и с точки зрения конкретных коррупциоген-
ных механизмов на уровне акторов. Однако в первом случае отсутствует возможность 
обобщенного объяснения коррупции, во втором — невозможно учесть переплетение 
коррупционных практик с конкретными культурными моделями. Современные под-
ходы изучения организаций позволяют плодотворно связать оба подхода в  концеп-
цию организационной коррупции. Эта концепция объясняет коррупцию как процесс 
нормализации в организационном контексте. Статья направлена на распространение 
такого подхода на аналитическую модель принятия решений в организациях. Эта мо-
дель должна: i) сохранить теоретическую обобщенность объяснения коррупционной 
практики, ii) оставаться концептуально открытой для анализа микро-, мезо- и макро-
процессов и iii) стать достаточно конкретной для реинтеграции результатов предыду-
щих исследований и будущих сравнительных исследований коррупции. Исходя из нео- 
институциональной теоретической базы ситуации принятия решений в организаци-
ях рассматриваются в противоречии между формально-юридическими параметрами 
и  легитимными целями организации, закрепленными в  ее формальной структуре. 
В зависимости от того, направлены ли решения против правовых параметров и орга-
низационных целей или они принимаются в соответствии с ними, изменяется вероят-
ность конформистских решений, информаторства (whistle blowing), индивидуальной 
или организационной коррупции. Теория учитывает влияние культурных феноменов 
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и факторов организационной культуры на процесс принятия решений. Модель учиты-
вает связь определенных российских концепций и понятий, предполагающих влияние 
на коррупцию.
Ключевые слова: организационная коррупция, неоинституциональный подход, анали-
тические рамки, коррумпированные решения, культурные паттерны.
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